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Legal rights and nature’s contributions to people: is there a connection? 1 
 2 
It has been claimed that approaches to conservation framed in terms of nature’s 3 
contributions to people are congenial to ones framed in terms of rights. This paper 4 
provides what has so far been lacking – namely, an argument in support of this claim. 5 
The argument takes its cue from the observation that nature’s contributions to people 6 
can take the form of contributions to cultural identity. It is then argued that in some 7 
such cases one can justify conserving the relevant natural entities by appealing to the 8 
relevant people’s legal right to their own cultural identity. In such instances, it is 9 
proposed, appeals to nature’s contributions to people really are consonant with 10 
appeals to legal rights. The argument is developed by means of a discussion of the 11 
cultural value of reindeer herding in Saami communities in northern Europe. 12 
 13 
1. Introduction 14 
 15 
The concept of nature’s contributions to people (NCP) has attracted a great deal of attention 16 
in recent years. Not everyone believes it provides a helpful way of framing conservation 17 
issues (see, for example, Braat 2018). But for its champions in the IPBES and elsewhere, it 18 
offers an attractively inclusive and culturally-sensitive way of speaking, writing and thinking 19 
about ‘all the contributions, both positive and negative, of living nature (diversity of 20 
organisms, ecosystems, and their associated ecological and evolutionary processes) to 21 
people’s quality of life’ (Díaz et al. 2018: 270). 22 
 Sandra Díaz et al. (2018) give several reasons to adopt what they call the NCP 23 
approach (2018: 270). Amongst other things, they claim, it ‘facilitates much more than 24 
previous framings the connection with rights-based approaches to conservation…’ (Díaz et 25 
al. 2018: 272)1 If it were true, that claim would have significant implications, for it would 26 
indicate that two prominent approaches to nature conservation are, appearances 27 
notwithstanding, in harmony with one another. But is it true? Some commentators remain 28 
unconvinced. Leon C. Braat  (2018) contends that Díaz and her co-authors ‘give no evidence 29 
from any peer-reviewed publication or policy document’ for their claim. Jasper O. Kenter 30 
(2018: 41) is also unpersuaded. In his view, it is ‘not evident how contributions could 31 
encompass rights’. 32 
This paper argues that the NCP approach really is amenable to rights-based 33 
approaches to conservation. Nature’s contributions to people can, it is suggested, take the 34 
form of contributions to cultural identity. In such instances, people derive part of their 35 
cultural identity from the natural (or partly natural) entities with which they have meaningful 36 
relationships. In such cases, the relevant relationships are likely to have what followers of the 37 
NCP approach call high relational value; and in some of these cases, it is argued, one can 38 
justify protecting the relevant natural entities by appealing to the relevant people’s legal right 39 
to their own cultural identity. 40 
This argument is developed by means of an appeal to a a concept that has come to 41 
play a prominent role in the NCP approach – namely, that of relational value (see Díaz et al. 42 
2015: 11). So we will begin by clarifying the meaning of that concept. 43 
 44 
2. Relational value 45 
                                                     
1 Díaz et al. do not explain what they mean by ‘rights-based approaches to conservation’. I 
will take that phrase to denote, not just approaches to conservation that respect, protect or 
fulfill the moral or legal rights of interested parties (on which, see Campese 2009), but also 




A distinction is often drawn between two approaches to nature conservation.2 Advocates of 47 
the first characteristically appeal to natural entities’ instrumental value as means to the end of 48 
human well-being. Advocates of the second characteristically argue that such entities should 49 
be protected because they have a value – often called intrinsic value - that does not derive 50 
from the contributions they make, or could make, to human well-being. 51 
 To appeal to relational value is to adopt a different approach (Chan et al. 2016). It is 52 
to begin by considering the value, not of certain natural entities, but of certain relationships 53 
between people and such entities. 54 
 These relationships are of a specific sort. First, just as NCPs can be either beneficial 55 
or detrimental to people, so the relevant relationships can be either positive or negative (see, 56 
e.g., Díaz et al. 2018: 270 and Knippenberg et al. 2018: 41). If positive, they ground 57 
relational values; if negative, they presumably ground relational disvalues. (This paper will 58 
focus on the former.) Second, the relevant sorts of relationships are not merely causal, but 59 
meaningful (Pascual et al. 2017: 15) To clarify that distinction, suppose that Marianne lives 60 
on the edge of a wood. For her, the wood is saturated with meaning. It is where she played as 61 
a girl; it is where she used to stroll on Sunday afternoons with the man who is now her 62 
husband; it is where the two of them now take their daughter Catherine to hunt for pine cones 63 
and other treasures. She enjoys a meaningful relationship with the place. But now suppose 64 
that, unbeknownst to them, Marianne and her family receive fresh water from a spring in the 65 
mountains high above their home. Though Marianne is causally related to the spring, she 66 
need not have a meaningful relationship with it. In fact, she might be unaware that it even 67 
exists. 68 
What exactly is supposed to have relational value in this and other such cases? The 69 
people? The entities? The relationship between them? Some combination of those three? The 70 
seminal papers on relational value, such as Díaz et al. 2015 and Chan et al. 2016, left this 71 
question open. In a recent contribution to the literature on this topic, however, Luuk 72 
Knippenberg et al. (2018) provide a more detailed account. 73 
Knippenberg et al. rightly point out that some human-nature relationships are 74 
themselves of value (ibid.: 41). This is so, they suggest, ‘in a myriad of instances running in 75 
scale from the interactions between a child and a dog, a farmer and her land, a community 76 
and its forest, a government agency designing a plan for landscape renewal, humanity 77 
struggling to keep the Earth whole.’ (ibid.: 41) 78 
In these sorts of cases, they claim, the relevant ‘relationship can be seen to have 79 
constitutive value, meaning that it is an integral part of a greater valuable whole’ 80 
(Knippenberg et al. 2018: 41). A ‘flourishing human life’ provides, they propose, an example 81 
of such a whole (ibid.: 41). But there are others. Kai M. A. Chan et al. (2016: 1462) suggest 82 
that the concept of relational value can help us to make sense of cases when nature 83 
contributes to a people’s sense of their own ‘cultural identity’ (see also, Pascual et al. 2017: 84 
11).  85 
It is plausible that in at least some such cases one is dealing with an NCP – more 86 
precisely, an instance where people derive some sort of benefit from nature. After all, to 87 
                                                     
2 In the following, I take the terms ‘nature’ and ‘the natural world’ to denote the kinds of 
entities (processes and events included) that environmentalists characteristically seek to 
protect. So, setting aside any tricky cases, old-growth woodlands, grizzly bears and the 
annual salmon run are ‘in’, while shopping malls, supermarket trolleys and the New Year 
Sales are ‘out’. Below, I discuss the semi-wild reindeer that are of cultural value to the Saami 




contribute to a person’s sense of their own cultural identity is in many cases to benefit that 88 
person. Conversely, people can be harmed when their sense of cutural identity is destabilised 89 
(see further, Kymlicka 1989: 175-7; Taylor 1994). It is plausible to suppose, then, that some 90 
meaningful human-nature relationships can have constitutive value on account of the 91 
contributions they make to a person’s – or, perhaps, a people’s - sense of their own cultural 92 
identity.  93 
 94 
3. Saami reindeer herding 95 
 96 
The meaning of that abstract claim may be clarified by appealing to a particular example. So, 97 
to this end, let us consider the meaningful relationship that obtains between reindeer and the 98 
Saami people of northern Europe. 99 
The Saami are a diverse people, and not all of them have traditionally lived and 100 
worked with reindeer (see further, Scheinin 2008: 166). Furthermore, in those Saami 101 
communities that are traditionally based on reindeer herding, reindeer are not as important as 102 
they once were. Nowadays only about ten-percent of Saami continue to herd the animals, and 103 
they rarely adopt the old practice of following the reindeer migration. Instead, they tend to 104 
work on specific parts of the reindeers’ grazing territories at specific times of year – and on 105 
snowmobiles and all-terrain vehicles rather than on foot or wooden skis. 106 
Be that as it may, reindeer still have much value for the Saami. They continue to 107 
provide them with meat and (though less often) milk, the means of transportation and the raw 108 
materials for the traditional (or traditional-looking) items, such as antler-handled knives and 109 
fur-lined boots, that are so popular with tourists. In particular, reindeer continue to have a 110 
great deal of cultural value for the Saami. Indeed, as one commentator notes, the practice of 111 
reindeer-herding ‘remains at the heart of their culture and is central to their celebrations and 112 
traditions’ (Crowder 2015). It is central to Saami languages, for instance. The language of 113 
Northern Saami, for its part, has well over 1000 terms for classifying reindeer according to 114 
sex, age, appearance, ownership and character. Their specificity is remarkable. An alesgahcin 115 
is a small backward-pointing tine on a reindeer antler at the point where the antler bends 116 
forward. A sarat is a smallish male reindeer that chases a female reindeer out of the herd in 117 
order to mate with it (Magga 2006: 29, 31). References to reindeer are essential to the 118 
language and to the associated form of life. In Northern Saami, for instance, ‘herd’ is eallu; 119 
‘life’, eallin (Benko 2011). 120 
Reindeer are also closely linked with the Saami’s sense of who, as a people, they are. 121 
As the anthropologist Robert Paine observes, many Saami continue to see themselves as 122 
reindeer herders; reindeer remain a key component of their ‘sense of self’ (Paine 1994: 199-123 
200, 113). As one Saami elder put it: ‘I have never had any other livelihood than reindeer 124 
management. For the whole of my life I have belonged to my District. I feel that the whole of 125 
my identity is bound up with my reindeer district…’ (quoted in Paine 1994: 191). 126 
 127 
4. The relational values of reindeer 128 
 129 
This paper’s aim is not to give a detailed and nuanced account of Saami reindeer herding; it is 130 
to make an abstract point about the connections between two approaches to nature 131 
conservation – one based on nature’s contributions to people, another on rights. Accordingly, 132 
we will here make certain assumptions which would not be made in a detailed and nuanced 133 
anthropological study of Saami reindeer herding. In particular, we will refer to the cultural 134 
identity of the Saami reindeer herders, as if – contrary to the facts – that group were culturally 135 
homogenous (see further, Paine 1994: 199-200, 113). 136 
 
 
 That proviso noted, let us view the herders’ relationship with their reindeer through 137 
the lens of the concept of relational value. 138 
The relevant meaningful relationship is that between reindeer and their Saami herders; 139 
and that relationship has value for the herders because it contributes to their sense of their 140 
own cultural identity. It does not do so merely as a means to that end. For the claim that the 141 
Saami-reindeer relationship is merely a means to the end of preserving the herders’ sense of 142 
their own cultural identity implies that that end could be brought about, if only in principle, 143 
by some other means. It implies, in other words, that the Saami-reindeer relationship is 144 
substitutable (see further, O’Neill 2007: 5-8). That, however, does not seem to be the case. It 145 
is reindeer herding, not sheep farming, say, or cattle ranching, that is important to the Saami 146 
reindeer herders - not just to their sense of who, as a people, they are, but to their sense of 147 
who, as individuals, they are in the light of that cultural identity. It is that practice that is a 148 
key component of their sense of who they are. In this case, there appear to be no alternative 149 
service providers. Indeed, instrumentalist talk of means and ends and the provision of cultural 150 
or other sorts of ecosystem services seems, in this context, to be inappropriate (see further, 151 
James 2015; Himes and Muraca 2018: 5). 152 
References to constitution seem more apt. It seems more appropriate to say that the 153 
practice of reindeer herding is part of or constitutive of the relevant whole – namely, the 154 
herders’ sense of their own cultural identity (see further, James, in press). In fact, some 155 
suggest that the culture of the Saami reindeer herders is ‘essentially based on reindeer 156 
husbandry’ (quoted at Eisenberg 2009: 129). However, whether or not that bold statement is 157 
true, it is clear that the practice of reindeer herding is very important to the herders’ sense of 158 
their own cultural identity; indeed that the herders would lose some sense of who they are, 159 
were their relationship with reindeer to be lost or transformed beyond recognition. 160 
 161 
5. Rights 162 
 163 
As we saw, Kenter (2018: 41) claims that ‘It is not evident how contributions could 164 
encompass rights.’ After all, he adds, ‘[i]t is clear that they [i.e., NCPs] are end-seeking, 165 
while rights are ends in themselves.’ He is partly right. To claim that reindeer make some sort 166 
of contribution to the Saami reindeer herders’ sense of their own cultural identity is not 167 
equivalent to claiming that the animals have any moral or legal rights. Nonetheless, appeals 168 
to NCPs can, in some cases, be consonant with appeals to rights. 169 
To see why, one must consider the concept of a right to cultural identity. It is true that 170 
not all political philosophers and political theorists agree that any such right exists (see, for 171 
instance, Waldron 1995). It is also true that a right to cultural identity functions at the level of 172 
what is called ‘soft’ law, which, amongst other things, is to say that it is not enshrined in any 173 
legally-binding instruments such as treaties. Even so, the concept of such a right plays an 174 
important role in several instruments that are of legal significance but not strictly binding. For 175 
example, the 2010 interim report of the International Law Association’s Committee on the 176 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples refers to the rights of such peoples ‘to recognition and 177 
preservation of their cultural identity’ as a rule of customary law (ILA 2010: 51). Similarly, 178 
the United Nations affirms the ‘the right of everyone, individually or in association with 179 
others or within a community or group… [t]o freely choose their own cultural identity’, 180 
where this is taken to include ‘the right of all persons to express their cultural identity freely 181 
and to exercise their cultural practices and way of life.’ (CESCR 2009: para. 49) The 182 
existence of a right to cultural identity is also implied by Article 8 of the United Nations 183 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states that ‘Indigenous peoples and 184 
individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their 185 
culture’ and that nation states should therefore ‘provide effective mechanisms for prevention 186 
 
 
of, and redress for… [a]ny action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their 187 
integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities’ (UN General 188 
Assembly 2007). 189 
Much more could be said about the concept of a right to cultural identity and its role 190 
in international law (see further, Piergigli 2013: esp. 598-602). For example, much more 191 
could be said about whether such rights are possessed by individuals or by groups (see 192 
further, Kymlicka 1989: Chapter 10). For present purposes, though, it is enough to note that 193 
the concept of a right to cultural identity does some useful work in international law 194 
(numerous examples are provided in Piergigli 2013 and Ferri 2018). 195 
Return to the case of the Saami. We have seen that the practice of reindeer herding 196 
plays an important role in their sense of their own cultural identity. It is reasonable to suppose 197 
that it also plays an important role in their cultural identity. Now suppose that the Saami have 198 
a legal right to their cultural identity. This would mean that the practice of reindeer herding 199 
would gain some measure of protection under the auspices of that right.3 It would also mean 200 
that the Saami’s reindeer would gain some protection. Not necessarily the individual reindeer 201 
– the practice of reindeer herding typically involves the castration, branding and slaughter of 202 
individual animals. But the Saami’s right to their own cultural identity would provide some 203 
measure of protection for the kind of which those individuals are members. One reason 204 
reindeer ought legally to be protected, the argument would go, is because the practice of 205 
reindeer herding is such an important part of Saami cultural identity.4 206 
 207 
6. General conclusions 208 
 209 
The preceding discussion of Saami reindeer herding implies the following general proposal. 210 
Take some entity, X. X may be a kind of organism conservationists wish to conserve, or it 211 
may not. It may not be an organism at all. It may, for instance, be a river or a particular 212 
ecosystem. My argument implies that for some entity, X, and some culturally-distinct people, 213 
Y, X may gain some protection under the auspices of the people of Y’s legal right to their 214 
own cultural identity, if the following three criteria are met: 215 
 216 
1. The people of Y have a meaningful relationship with X. 217 
2. Were that relationship to disappear, the cultural identity of those people would be 218 
destabilised. 219 
3. The people of Y have a legal right to their cultural identity. 220 
 221 
Criterion 1 describes one kind of NCP – that is to say, one way that nature can benefit people. 222 
Criterion 2 refers to a state in which the meaningful relationship that obtains between certain 223 
people and certain natural entities has value as part of those people’s cultural identity. As we 224 
saw, that sort of value cannot be adequately conceived of in terms of instrumentalist, service-225 
focused conceptual schemes. However, as we also saw, it can be adequately conceived of in 226 
terms of a concept that is central to the NCP approach – namely, that of relational value. In 227 
cases where the three criteria spelt out above are met, then, natural entities may gain some 228 
                                                     
3 On the use of legal instruments such as Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the forthcoming (though as yet unratified) Nordic Saami Convention 
in debates concerning the cultural rights of the Saami, see Bankes and Koivurova 2013, 
Scheinin 2008 and Donders 2002: Chapter XI. 
4 It is a further question whether this means that the reindeer ought, all things considered, to 
be protected. Maybe, for instance, protecting them would violate the rights of some other 
cultural group. I set this complication aside here. 
 
 
protection under the auspices of a people’s legal right to their own cultural identity precisely 229 
because the relevant nature-people relationship has a sort of value that is both central to the 230 
NCP approach and (arguably) at odds with appeals to ecosystem services. To this extent, 231 
Díaz et al’s claim is borne out. In this sort of case, the NCP approach really is congenial to 232 
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